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1 Introduction
A generation after the emergence on the global
scene of Islamic feminism, we are now witness to
the appearance of a ‘Muslim holistic feminism’.
Like the pioneering secular feminism/s that
Muslims and non-Muslims created together early
in the last century in their national spaces, the
new Muslim holistic feminism draws upon
multiple discourses, including Islamic discourse.
But, unlike these secular feminisms, Muslim
holistic feminism is communally based (of, for,
and by Muslims) and globally anchored.
The final major feminist challenge that activists
face today in Muslim majority countries is
achieving equality in the family. Long after
significant equality was realised in the public
domain (although this is unfinished business),
gender inequality in the family remains
widespread, sustained by fiqh-backed, state-
enacted laws. Islamic feminist discourse has
made two potentially useful theoretical advances:
(1) breaking down the notion that the sphere of
the family constitutes a separate domain positing
instead a continuum of private/family and
public/society; and (2) dismantling the notion
that Islam ordains a patriarchal construction of
the family. This lays important groundwork for
arguing against gender inequality shored up by
Muslim family laws. However, intensive and
broad-based local political work is needed to
move from a patriarchal to an egalitarian model
of the family.
Today, in an era of religious revival, communal
identity is fore-fronted. Social movement
organising is being exported by Muslim women
from global to national spaces in contrast to
earlier practice in Muslim majority societies
when feminist movements were locally grounded
and organised within a national context. Nation-
based feminist movements, such as the
pioneering Egyptian feminist movement,
accessed the world of international feminism and
did so on its own terms. These national feminist
movements were organised and directed by
women as citizens of different religions.
Organising activism along communal lines and
exporting social movement activism from the
global arena to national space is new to our time.
This article reviews the historically changing
constructions of ‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’,
at a time when they are politically over-loaded
and central items in the linguistic arsenal. I
observe the feminist trajectory from secular
feminism to Islamic feminism to the emerging
Muslim holistic feminism, pointing to the
simultaneity of the different feminisms. I speak
of the communalisation of women’s rights
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activism and reflect on the implications of this at
the local level. The underlying argument here is
that the communalisation of women’s rights – or
the privileging of Muslim women’s rights and its
export from the global to local terrain, is a
potentially divisive force that threatens national
cohesion and can constitute another element in
the marginalisation of non-Muslim citizens.
2 Positionings and multiple identities
Like many women today, my positionings and
identities are multiple and complex. It is as a life-
long feminist, scholar-activist and historian of
feminisms that I come to the subject of this
article. As a young scholar in the 1960s, I began
research on the rise and evolution of feminism in
Egypt and the Middle East. From the 1990s, when
Islamic feminism was ascendant, I broadened my
scope to include the global Muslim world in which
it circulated. My feminism first bloomed four
decades ago as a form of consciousness, thinking,
activism simultaneously in the USA and in Egypt
while living, studying and moving between the
two countries. I am a citizen of the USA by birth
and of Egypt by choice, allowed to me by the
patriarchal structuring of naturalisation.1 I do not
publically position myself within a religious
framework and am not interested in having
legitimacy conferred or withheld by my religious
identity. Irrespective of my religious affiliation
and nationality through marriage to a Muslim
citizen, I am subject to Egypt’s Muslim Personal
Status Code. For more than four decades, I have
been a ‘woman living under Muslim Law’ in
Egypt. When it was being formed in the mid-
1980s, I became part of the global network:
Women Living under Muslim Law (WLUML). As
one subject to the Muslim Personal Code in
Egypt, I have an immediate stake in how it is
re/constructed, and as I see it, a responsibility to
become directly engaged in building a locally
based movement.
My analysis and interpretation of feminism,
Islam and culture, come from my research and
my participation in debate, which are informed
by the world of lived realities. My activism is
inspired by real-life challenges that I, along with
other women in the places where I live and work,
experience as we defend our rights – the right to
speak, to be heard, to be equal and to be
included as guaranteed to us as citizens by our
national constitutions. Our activism is directed
towards achieving specific goals and changing
structures of thinking and the laws that express
them. To these tasks, we bring the various tools
we possess, including our different vantage
points and varied experiences.
Egyptian feminist, Saiza Nabarawi (a close
partner of the pioneering feminist leader, Huda
Sha’rawi), confessed to me more than four
decades ago that the greatest disappointment of
the founding feminists was their inability to make
significant headway in reforming the Muslim
Personal Status Code and their unhappiness over
the injustices such failure perpetuates. I place
myself alongside others in the long struggle to
complete the quest for gender equality, and
especially the unfinished business of equality in
the family and gender justice more broadly.
3 The secular and the religious
The equality struggle has been fought on terrain
variously claimed, constituted and staked out over
time and space by ‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’.
The extent to which many have been imprisoned
by terms taken to be far more narrow and static
than the dynamic realities suggest, is striking. It
is also striking to observe how ‘the religious’ is
equated with ‘the indigenous’ or ‘the authentic’
and ‘the secular’ with ‘the alien’, a notion with a
history stretching back to colonial days. ‘Secular’,
which is often simplistically seen as religion’s
other, needs to be unpacked and historicised. In
Egypt, the term for secularism/secularisation was
coined in Arabic in the late nineteenth century as
almaniyya. It denoted a separation of state and
religious authority and the process by which the
modern state in formation assumed legal and
institutional responsibility for matters previously
under the purview of the religious authorities
(Badran 1999, 2009). The state during
secularisation took it upon itself to protect
religion, not just Islam, but all religions. The
state instituted a system of secular education
leaving to Al Azhar, the ancient seat of religious
learning, the teaching of the Islamic sciences.
Law was secularised, with the exception of
personal status or family law (this article uses the
two terms interchangeably) that was left under
the aegis of the religious authorities. The state
enacted separate religiously backed personal
status codes for Muslims and Christians.
However, in the process of the codification of the
Muslim Personal Status Code by the state in the
early twentieth century, foreign elements were
absorbed (Sonbol 1996).
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There have been different constructions of the
secular in Muslim majority countries ranging
from the singular example of the total
evacuation of the religious from the state and
public sphere in Turkey (although the secular
state retained administration of religious
properties including mosques), to the Egyptian
model that is described above and that was
followed in the Arab countries of the east
Mediterranean and Iraq (the Arab east). In the
Maghreb, with its experience of French colonial
rule, different from the French mandate system
in Syria and Lebanon and to the less directly
interventionist British colonial practices, there
was a sharper distinction and polarisation
between the secular and the religious than in the
Arab east. These varying modes of secularism
have held diverse implications for feminism in
different national locations (Badran 1995;
Kandiyoti 1991; Lazreg 1994; Thompson 2000).
In Egypt, as elsewhere in the Arab east, the term
‘secular’ was also used to denote a state whose
constitutions declare all citizens equal,
irrespective of religion and whose national
cohesion was not based on religious affiliation.2
Countries like Egypt – under colonialism with
policies of ‘divide and rule’ or declining Ottoman
suzerainty, which organised populations under its
control into separate millets ordered by religion
and ethnicity – sought to construct themselves as
sovereign territorial countries and their
populations as equal citizens. The secular nation-
state signified a territorially based state
composed of equal citizens sharing a common
land. Early last century in the colonial and
postcolonial moment, ‘secular’ was also used to
signify national specificity. For example, secular
nationalism indicated Egyptian nationalism and
the secular feminist movement signalled the
Egyptian feminist movement (Badran 1995). This
usage, however, gradually disappeared.
In Egypt from the time the nation-state was
being consolidated early in the twentieth century
until around the 1970s, the term secular
generally carried a positive connotation. This is
not to say there were not those who previously
claimed that ‘secular’ was a synonym for
‘Western and un-religious’, as the Muslim
Brothers did following their creation in 1928.
But, from the 1970s, the term secular began to
be heavily demonised when the rising forces of
political Islam or Islamists who, in opposing the
secular state, branded ‘the secular’ as Western
and un-Islamic or anti-Islamic and, accordingly,
the secular state as illegitimate. In the 1970s and
1980s the terms ‘secularism with religion’ and
‘secularism without religion’ began to circulate
indicating two ways of understanding secularism.
However, the later meaning gained ground with
the continuing spread of political Islam (Badran
2009) and the secular and the religious came to
be seen as stark and oppositional categories.3
Scholarship and ongoing historical investigation
is now showing ways the secular and the religious
have mutually constructed each other (Asad
2003; Hurd 2008). The persistent perception of
‘the religious’ and ‘the secular’ as distinct, that is
reinforced by political Islam, keeps alive the
notion of sharp and, indeed, antithetical
demarcations. As part of their polarising political
project, Islamists re-invigorate not only the
secular/religious binary but also East/West,
public/private and male/female oppositions.
Islamists’ assiduous promotion of the notion that
‘the secular’ is alien, foreign, non-native and
hence inauthentic and that ‘the religious
constitutes the indigenous, native and authentic
is deliberately divisive and carries negative
implications for feminisms.
4 Secular and Islamic feminisms
Feminism, because it involves the awareness and
analysis of gender inequality and women’s
deprivation of their rights and efforts by women
to redress wrongs, poses a threat to entrenched
patriarchal power and privilege. Feminism which
first appeared in Egypt and other Muslim-
majority countries during the colonial era was
branded by its adversaries as Western and anti-
Islamic and thus a pernicious form of colonial
cultural invasion. The notion of feminism as a
Western and an alien assault upon religion – and
of secular as Western and anti-religious –
re-enforced by Islamists, persists to this day.
History, however, reveals a different story. In
Egypt, from the moment Muslim women first
began to articulate their feminism, they drew
inspiration from religion in seeking the
restoration of their rights as women that Islam
had granted them. Christians also claimed that
women’s rights were religiously endorsed.
Religious argumentation was embedded in the
secular (national) feminism that Muslims and
Christians as Egyptian citizens shaped together
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in the nation-state they shared and for whose
liberation they had fought side-by-side (Badran
1995). The nation-based secular feminism, which
Egyptians and others created in the early
twentieth century emerged in the form of social
movements. These feminist movements were
connected to secular nationalist movements
agitating for independence from colonial rule –
calling simultaneously for women’s rights and
national rights – and were at the same time part
of movements for religious reform (Jayawardena
1986). Following national independence, secular
feminists directed their attention to building
new institutions of state and society inclusive of
women using constitutional, democratic, and
humanitarian arguments. Secular feminists
argued for equality in the public sphere (that is,
the secular public sphere, not the domain of the
religious professions and ritual which would late
be taken up by Islamic feminism), while in the
domain of the family they upheld the notion of
the complementarity of gender roles, not gender
equality, which in keeping with the general
knowledge of their day, they accepted as
ordained by religion and nature (Badran 1995).
Unlike secular feminism’s emergence in the form
of a social movement, Islamic feminism burst on the
global scene in the late twentieth century in the
form of a discourse – a trenchant religiously
framed discourse of gender equality. Muslim
women in different parts of the globe from Iran
to Malaysia as well as in the West simultaneously
in the late 1980s and the 1990s began to
articulate a discourse of women’s rights and
gender equality going directly to the Qur’an and
other religious texts, exercising their own ijtihad
or independent critical examination. Iranian
legal anthropologist Ziba Mir-Hosseini, and a
major figure in the production of the new
gender-sensitive Islamic knowledge, was among
the first to report what she called ‘a feminist
reading of the Shari’a’ (Mir-Hosseini 1996) – that
some secular feminist Muslims in different parts
of the world would soon label Islamic feminism
(Badran 1999). It is important to note that those
who have been recognised as the producers of
this new discourse did not regard their
formulations of gender equality and gender
justice grounded in their re-readings of religious
texts as ‘Islamic feminism’. Indeed they typically
rejected this term and did not identify
themselves as feminists (of any sort) but
preferred to position themselves as committed
scholars of Islam. In time, however, some came to
accept the term Islamic feminism.
It might be seen as ironic that the scholar who
has been credited with writing the first book-
length text of Islamic feminism was a secular
feminist. Moroccan feminist sociologist, Fatima
Mernissi, troubled by the rampant misogyny
perpetuated in the name of Islam in the form of
hadiths (reported sayings and deeds of the Prophet
Mohammed) to denigrate and intimidate women
undertook her own investigation of hadiths. Using
classical Islamic methodologies, she exposed
many commonly circulating misogynist hadiths as
spurious (Mernissi 1987 in French; 1991 in
English). Moroccan cultural studies specialist,
Raja Rhouni, who offers an incisive analysis of
Mernissi’s work and through the example of
Mernissi, demonstrates ways individuals may
generate and operate within the framework of
both secular and Islamic feminisms (Rhouni
(2009).
An early collective contribution to the production
of Islamic feminism came from Sisters in Islam
(SIS), created by professional, scholarly, and
activist women in Malaysia in the 1980s, and
credited as being the first Islamic feminist
association. Since many practices oppressive to
women were justified in the name of religion,
Sisters in Islam proceeded from women’s real-life
experience to Qur’anic investigation. They took
up the issue of wife-beating, for example, and
demonstrated that the Qur’an did not condone
the practice as many have been led to believe.
They disseminated their findings in accessible
language via inexpensive pamphlets in order to
reach a wide public (Badran 1999, 2009). The
idea of scholarship-activism that became central
to Islamic feminism was first manifested by
Sisters in Islam, and indeed, many women, whom
others labelled Islamic feminists, called
themselves scholar-activists (Webb 2000).4
In the West, Muslim women from convert and
immigrant communities in the USA produced
what soon became regarded as key foundational
texts of Islamic feminism. African-American
theologian Amina Wadud (also one of the
founders of Sisters in Islam) articulated a theory
of gender equality based on her Qur’anic
hermeneutic work first published in Kuala
Lumpur (Wadud 1991) and later in New York
(Wadud 1999). She followed this up later with a
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powerful statement of human equality embedded
in what she calls the ‘tawhidic paradigm’,
demonstrating that God is unique and above
human beings who are on the same plane and
equal to each other (Wadud 2008). Pakistani-
American international relations scholar Asma
Barlas, deconstructed patriarchy and the
inequality it perpetuated in the name of Islam
Barlas (2002). The work of Wadud and Barlas
was soon translated into many languages
commonly spoken by Muslims, enabling activists
in their struggle to reform Muslim family laws to
offer compelling argumentation that the
patriarchy is un-Islamic.
An Islamic discourse of equality has broad
implications. Wadud’s tawhidic paradigm applies
not simply to Muslims but to all human beings –
to the equality all citizens irrespective of gender
and religion. Indeed, non-Muslims as well as
Muslims have welcomed Islamic feminism’s
articulation of equality.
The following two sections look at shifts in
feminist organising. The first section looks at
locally grounded citizen-inclusive feminist
activism within the context of a Muslim-majority
country. The second section discusses exclusivist
communalised feminist activism spearheaded by
a Muslim women’s global network and exported
to national locations.
5 Secular and Islamic feminisms: local ground,
shared interests, mutual need
Secular and Islamic feminisms have been
mutually re-enforcing. Not only is there an
important secular feminist past behind Islamic
feminism but also an ongoing side-by-side
presence of the two feminisms. Activists have
used both secular and Islamic discourses in their
campaigns to achieve women’s rights and gender
equality. In the early twentieth century, secular
feminists accessed Islamic modernist discourse
and from the late twentieth century, they drew
upon the new Islamic feminist discourse. While
some feminists prefer to use only constitutional
and human rights arguments, in campaigns to
reform fiqh-backed family laws, activists must use
Islamic arguments.
Although feminist organising, which goes back to
the early twentieth century in Egypt, included
calls for the reform of Muslim family law as an
integral part of its comprehensive agenda, little
head-way was achieved. In Turkey, Tunisia, and
south Yemen, the few places where advances
were made in the twentieth century towards
progressive – but not fully egalitarian – family
laws, they were bestowed from on high by the
states, which used family law reform as part of
their larger political and nation-building agendas
(Kandiyoti 1991; Charrad 2001; Molyneux 1991).
It was only in the twenty-first century (in Turkey
and Morocco) when the interests of feminists
and the state coincided, that the patriarchal
model of the family was overturned in favour of
an egalitarian model. The 2001 revisions of the
secular Turkish Civil Code and the 2004 fiqh-
backed Moroccan Mudawana cast husband and
wife as equal heads of family. The Turkish Civil
Code of 1926, which had gone the furthest in
dismantling the patriarchal model of the family,
fell short in enshrining the husband as head of
family, revealing that gender inequalities could
be sustained not only in Islamically backed law
but in secular law as well. This was contrary to
the widespread belief that secular law, especially
law explicitly modelled on a western prototype
(the Turkish law was patterned after the Swiss
model), meant full gender equality.
The 2004 Mudawana, as the only existing fiqh-
backed egalitarian family law, serves as a powerful
inspiration today for women in other countries.
The Moroccan example demonstrates that fiqh-
backed family legislation is not immutable sacred
law and shows that it is possible within an Islamic
framework to enact into law an egalitarian model
of the family. The Moroccan and Turkish cases
show the importance of independent feminist
organising – and in the Moroccan instance, the
power of combined secular and Islamic feminist
argumentation. The Turkish and Moroccan
revisions came after two decades of intense
feminist activism and at a moment when the
regimes in both countries found it in their political
interest to switch from a patriarchal to an
egalitarian model of family law. In demanding
reform of their secular family law, Turkish activists
advanced arguments drawn from democratic and
human rights discourse (Toprak 2010). Moroccan
activists, as just noted, marshalled both Islamic
and secular arguments (Mir-Hosseini 2009;
Balchin 2009: 224; Pruzan 2011). In Turkey and
Morocco, countries with miniscule minorities,
family law activists were virtually all Muslims.
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In Egypt and other Arab countries of the east
Mediterranean and Iraq (unlike Turkey and
Morocco) there are well-established Christian
communities with ancient roots. Women from
these communities formed an integral part of
early twentieth century nationalist and feminist
movements in Egypt. In organising, setting
priorities and strategising, feminists understood
that it was important to their success that their
feminist movements gained the backing and
input of a wide base of citizenry. The composition
of the feminist movement, like the nationalist
movement, reflected the religious diversity that
was a hallmark of Egypt and a source of strength.
Demands for the reform of the Muslim Personal
Status Code were an integral part of the
comprehensive feminist agenda in Egypt, which
Muslim and Christian women jointly created and
supported.
Today in the context of widespread religious
revival and assertion of religious identity, the
broad cooperation that has been a fundamental
mark of Egyptian feminist campaigning –
including the push for the reform of the Muslim
Personal Status Code – is now threatened by the
spread of communalism. One of the first areas
affected by the intensifying communalisation is
the now century-old cooperative effort in Egypt
in seeking reform of the Muslim Personal Status
Code.
Not only is broad work critical to success in
altering any state-enacted laws, including the
Muslim Personal Status Code, but the Egyptian
Muslim Personal Status Code directly affects
more than just Muslims. It is not only Muslims
but some non-Muslims who fall under the
purview of the Muslim Personal Status Code, and
who accordingly have a direct interest in reform
work. The non-Muslims include wives of Muslims
(typically of foreign origin) and Christians
belonging to different denominations in Egypt,
who in seeking divorce (to give one example),
fall under the jurisdiction of the Muslim law
(Tadros 2009).
Now in Egypt, more than ever before, broad-
based political work is necessary not only to
achieve feminist goals but in the interests of
national unity, which is threatened by
communalism. Feminist, democracy and human
rights movements need to re-enforce each other
but this is difficult as heavy state security
measures inhibit independent activist organising
of any sort. Emergency law in effect in Egypt for
over three decades enables a wide range of
escalating security measures aimed at
controlling perceived Islamist threats.
Significant change in the Muslim Personal Status
Code in Egypt could ignite Islamist opposition
which the state is fearful to risk and therefore
such reform is stalled.
The feminist struggle to reform Muslim family
law in Egypt is first and foremost an internal
battle (as it was in Turkey and Morocco).
Egyptian women in their long history of feminist
activist work exploited international and
regional or transnational forums and networks
when they decided it could serve their interests.
They remained in charge of their own agenda
even in the early and middle decades of the last
century in international forums under the
shadow of imperial feminisms (Badran 1995;
Rupp 1997). Today, broad collaboration across
lines of religion and locally anchored feminist
activism are threatened in ways discussed below.
6 From secular and Islamic feminist collaboration
to communalism; from the global to the local
There has been positive synergy between secular
feminism and Islamic feminism and cooperation
between activists of different religions, as noted
above. Increasingly, however, communalism is
threatening the collaboration of Muslim and
non-Muslim citizens and internal cohesion
within nations. I am not interested here in the
communalism among the ranks of the religious
and political conservatives, but rather how
communalism is being fed from within the world
of feminism and more specifically through
progressive Muslim women’s global organising. I
look at Musawah (equality in Arabic), which is a
transnational organisation created and run by
and for Muslims. Musawah announced itself as ‘A
global movement for equality and justice in the
Muslim Family’ at its launch in the spring of
2009 at a large conference in Kuala Lumpur. The
event was hosted by Sisters in Islam, the veteran
Islamic feminist organisation now two decades
old, which has played a central role in the
creation of Musawah.5
Musawah is directed by a small nucleus of
Muslim women that focuses on the reform of
Muslim family laws. Musawah’s planning
committee is composed of a small group that
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includes highly respected scholars and seasoned
activists, some with roots in Islamic feminism
and others with more secular experience
(Musawah 2009; www.musawah.org). In the run-
up to its launch, Musawah held a number of
closed planning committee meetings, including
one in Cairo in 2007, and post-launch held a
meeting in Cairo in January 2010. For an
organisation aiming for massive global outreach,
Musawah runs a tight ship, as was noticed in
Cairo last winter.6 Egypt will be the upcoming
focal point for activism conducted through the
local NGO called the Center for Egyptian
Women’s Legal Assistance (CEWLA) whose head
and founder is Azza Suleiman, a lawyer and
member of Musawah’s planning committee
(www.cewla.org; Abu-Lughod 2010a,b).
The Musawah Framework for Action (Musawah
2009) and Musawah publication Wanted: Why
Equality and Justice Now (Anwar 2009) prepared
for the launch and edited by Zainah Anwar,
president of Sisters in Islam, explain that the
organisation takes a holistic approach to rights
work, using multiple discourses including
‘religious, human rights, constitutional, and
fundamental guarantees, and women’s lived
realities’ (Anwar 2009). The religious discourse
holds a special prominence, as indicated in the
stunning collection of papers published in Wanted
by leading scholars of Islam and prominent
activists whose work has influenced both Islamic
and secular feminists.
Because of its communalism, I call Musawah’s
project ‘Muslim holistic feminism’. In using
Islamic feminism’s theorisation of equality and
justice grounded in religious sources, together
with the secular discourses of democracy and
human rights, the new Muslim holistic feminism
echoes the multi-stranded discursive approach
that characterised the secular feminism which
emerged in Egypt early in the last century and
was developed elsewhere in the region. As such,
secular feminism was a holistic feminism before
the term ‘holism’ came into use. We have seen
earlier that ‘secular’ was another way to convey
holistic.
However, there are clear differences in these two
holistic feminisms. First, the pioneering secular
feminism was created by Muslims and non-
Muslims together as citizens in their respective
countries. Second, as just mentioned, secular
feminists proceeded from their national base to
access the world of international feminism and
used its forums and networks on their own terms.
Their international organising (what they called
‘international’ would now be referred to as
‘transnational’) was grounded in national
associations which functioned as the centres of
gravity. Third, secular feminism emerged on the
scene in the form of organic social movements in
progress, while the new Muslim holistic feminism
of Musawah surfaced as an envisioned movement.
Fourth, secular feminism was organised by
politicised women who were first and foremost
activists, while the new Muslim holistic feminism
as the product of scholar-activists exhibits a
highly developed theoretical structure. Fifth,
secular feminism began and long remained
voluntary and self-funding and has preserved this
tradition, even as it has become increasingly
‘NGO-ised’ to use Islah Jad’s expression, and
although some secular feminists as NGO leaders
and staff are now remunerated their
organisations retain the openness that has been
the mark of secular feminism (Jad 2004). Muslim
holistic feminism is being jump-started by
income-earning professional women, public
intellectuals, and NGO-ers who are savvy, well-
connected, cosmopolitan and income-earning
(Abu-Lughod 2010a).
The new holistic Muslim feminism is being
propelled during a moment when the USA and
other Western governments are endeavouring to
produce moderate Muslims and moderate or
moderated behaviours, in the context of their
larger political and security concerns and Muslim
women are seen as ideal agents (Abu-Lughod
2010a). The pioneering secular feminism of the
last century, on the other hand, emerged in the
context of intense anti-colonial struggles.
A glimpse at Musawah’s focus on ‘equality and
justice in the Muslim family’ provides an insight
into the new Muslim holistic feminism in the
making and what separates it from secular
feminism which dealt with the functional family
(unqualified by religion) along with trying to
reform Muslim family law. One asks of
Musawah: ‘Why the Muslim family? Is this an
elision between ‘the Muslim family’ and Muslim
family law? But, more to the point, ‘What is ‘the
Muslim family’? This is a question I asked at
Musawah’s launch but no answer was
forthcoming and at a subsequent conference held
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in Cairo, I asked some Musawah members again
to no avail. Avoidance of the question of what
constitutes a Muslim family indicates reluctance
on the part of Muslim holistic feminists to deal
with the contemporary reality of the religiously
mixed marriage about which An-Na’im and
others have written (An-Na’im 2005). This
indicates the limits, or the hesitation, of
communally based feminism to deal with intra-
religious gender issues and especially those
related to the family.
The intention of this article has been to look at the
porosities and complexities of ‘the secular’ and
‘the religious’ as they play out in the feminisms
Muslim women have created, together with
women from other religions, as well as separately
in national and global spaces. I wanted to reflect
on the continuities as well as the new directions in
feminist thinking and activism in the context
shifting grounds. I wanted to look at this from
within the context of the nation-state and the
context of global feminism and their
constituencies. The appearance on the scene of
communal feminism, that I have called ‘Muslim
holistic feminism’, is a striking new departure that
deserves attention. I have looked at this
phenomenon as expressed through Musawah
(although there are other sites where Muslim
holistic feminism is appearing) to consider its
implications. Muslim holistic feminism is still early
in the making and like other works in progress, it
is fluid and not always consistent in its self-
presentation, which can be viewed as a mark of
creative dynamism. I have raised irksome issues
out of the conviction that acknowledging them is
essential to dealing with them – to discovering the
conceptual, practical, and political possibilities and
limits of various approaches. I end with three
questions: (1) Whose interests do the new Muslim
holistic feminists serve? (2) How can the rights of
the communal and the national be honoured in the
fluid spaces between the secular and the religious?
(3) Does secular feminism have a future?
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1 Foreign women married to Egyptian citizens
are permitted citizenship, while foreign men
married to Egyptians are not.
2 The secular and religious have been
complexly interwoven in the ‘secular state’ as
the case of Egypt has illustrated, where the
constitution declares Islam to be the state
religion and where the 1971 constitution
declared the Sharia to be a source of law and
the 1980 constitution declares that the Sharia
is the source of all law (not just the Muslim
Personal Status Code). However, this did not
result in the Islamicisation of law. The latter
changes occurred in the context of the spread
of Islamism.
3 In the 1970s and 1980s when ‘almaniyya bila din’
began to be used to signify secularism without
religion, the implication was that ‘almaniyya’
did not necessarily imply secularism as devoid
of religion. Although with the spread of
Islamic secularism it became commonly
understood as un-Islamic and even anti-
Islamic. I remember discussing this shift in
meaning with colleagues at the time.
4 Gisela Webb (2000: xi–xix), the centrality
scholarship-activist and the scholar-activist in
Muslim women’s theoretical and applied work
on women, gender, and Islam, points specifically
to North American experience. Later, a South
African scholar of Islam and gender, Sa’diyya
Shaikh found that the battered women she
interviewed developed what she calls a ‘tafsir
(exegesis) of praxis’ finding for themselves a
contradiction between the ethical message of the
Qur’an and the brutalities they experienced at the
hands of their Muslim husbands (Shaikh 2007).
5 I participated in this event held in Kuala
Lumpur attending the plenary events and
breakout sessions as well as engaging in
numerous conversations.
6 I was in Cairo at the time and heard
complaints from Muslims about exclusivity,
who were eager to be in the loop.
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